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Congress responded to the problem of Medicare and Medicaid provider
fraud by strengthening its anti-kickback statute to reduce collusive referrals
between health care professionals. An unintended result was uncertainty for
joint-venturing providers wishing to conduct their practices in accordance with
the law. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(IPAA) attempted to remedy this dilemma. By requiring the Office of the
Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of Health and Human Services to
issue advisory opinions concerning inquiring physicians' conduct, HIPAA
aimed to simplify physicians' compliance with the anti-kickback statute. The
author explores the realities of issuing federal agency advisory opinions: the
ineffectiveness ofprior agency attempts to advise, the burden placed on OIG in
providing advisory opinions, and the conflicting advisory roles the agency must
juggle in responding to Congress's mandate. Trying to reconcile its mandated
advisory and enforcement duties has left OIG "shopping for hats. " The author
concludes with suggestions for reforming the advisory opinion process.
Since its creation in 1965, the Medicare program has helped millions of
people by providing health care services to those who could not otherwise have
afforded it. Medicare was born in an era in which health care policy was
struggling to address inequities in the health care system, both in terms of
access and cost distribution. 1 By 1950, private health insurance plans covered
fifty-one percent of the population, but unfortunately this system excluded many
types of services and failed to provide coverage for large segments of the
population, particularly the poor and the elderly.2 Congress created the
Medicare and Medicaid programs to increase access to health care to these
underprivileged groups.3 Medicare and Medicaid were predicated under a
policy of containing the ever-increasing costs of health care. 4 Unfortunately, the
* I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Sharon Davies for her inspiration. I
would also like to thank Professor Art Greenbaum, Robert Johnson, and Don Kacmar. My
parents and family have my deepest thanks for their support throughout my education.
1 See Theodore N. McDowell, The Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse
Amendments: Their Impact on the Present Health Care System, 36 EMORY L.J. 691, 691
(1987).
2 See McDowell, supra note 1, at 695.
3 See id.
4 See Raymond G. Davis, Congress and the Emergence of Public Health Policy,
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structure of the programs (and the health care system in general) created cost-
enhancing incentives, and consequently cost-enhancing behavior by providers
and beneficiaries alike.5 The perverse financial incentives inherent in the system
have been cited as a driving force behind the exponentially inflating costs of
health care.6
One of the most problematic aspects of the system is its tendency to induce
fraud. Since the inception of Medicare and Medicaid, fraud by health care
providers has been a gross thorn in the side of the program's efforts to achieve
cost efficiency. Currently, it is estimated that fraud and abuse account for up to
ten percent of all national health care expenditures. 7 In 1994, federal spending
for the Medicare program totaled $162 billion and is expected to double in the
next ten years.8
Congress's response to the burgeoning health care fraud crisis has been to
strengthen the Medicare and Medicaid anti-fraud and abuse statutes. These
statutes create a complex statutory and regulatory scheme providing for a wide
range of criminal, civil, and administrative sanctions. 9 Of particular
controversy is the so-called "anti-kickback" statute.' 0 This statute places limits
on the extent providers can refer Medicare and Medicaid patients to other
providers, a practice that is widely believed to increase cost to the system by
encouraging overutilization of goods and services.11 At tension with the
HEALTH CARE MGMr. REV., Winter 1985, at 61, 67-69.
5 See McDowell, supra note 1, at 691.
6 See id. at 699. Between 1965 and 1983, national health care expenditures increased
from $42 billion to $355 billion. See also Robert M. Gibson et al., National Health
Expenditures, 1983, 6 HEALTH CARE FIN. Rv. 1, 7 (1984). In 1983, Medicare and Medicaid
financed 29% of all expenditures on personal health care. The rhetoric of crisis became
prominent in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Fortine magazine described the health care
system as "on the brink of chaos." It's 7ime to Operate, FORTUNE, Jan. 1970, at 79.
7 See John R. Munich, The Medicaid Anti-Fraud Amendments of 1994: Attorney
General's Newest Weapon in the Fight Against White Collar Crime, 52 J. Mo. B. 26, 26
(1996).
8 See Ellen L. Janos & M. Daria Niewenhous, White Coat Crime or Hospital-Physician
Financial Relationships in the 90s, BosroN B.J., May-June 1996, at 8. The Government
Accounting Office (GAO) estimates Medicare and Medicaid fraud and abuse account for 10%
of health care expenditures. See id. If GAO spending estimates are accurate, federal spending
for Medicare will top $300 billion by the year 2004. Unless improvements are made in fraud
reduction, fraud and abuse could cost the government over $30 million annually.
9 See id.
10 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (1995).
11 The Health Care Financing Administration believes that it has been conclusively
proven that a physician who has a financial interest in the entity providing patient services will
offer more tests and services. See Janos & Niewenhous, supra note 8, at 8. A hypothetical
demonstrates the potential risk to the Medicare system. Imagine Dr. John, whose practice has
just been purchased by a mega health care conglomerate. Dr. John sees Sally Patient, who is
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statute's kickback and referral prohibitions is a trend among providers to
engage in joint ventures to become more competitive in today's changing
market.12 These joint ventures typically involve some form of referrals among
the venturing entities, which worries the parties involved that they may be in
violation of the anti-kickback statute. The result of this tension has been a back-
and-forth dialogue between health care providers and the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) regarding the scope and reach of the anti-kickback
provisions. Providers who engage in joint ventures desire certainty that they
will not be prosecuted under what has proved to be an uncertain statute. HHS,
like any other agency, wants to maintain a flexible approach to enforcing the
statute.
Congress significantly altered the battlefield with the enactment of the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). 13 Among HIPAA's
provisions is an advisory opinion mandate which forces HHS's Office of the
Inspector General (OIG) to provide on-demand guidance to venturing providers
regarding the application of the anti-kickback statute. This Comment will examine
the mandate in light of the current health care regulatory environment. Part I will
examine today's health care environment, including the trend toward joint ventures
and integrated delivery systems, and the impact of the anti-kickback provision on
this trend. Part II will examine in detail the mandates of HIPAA. Part I will
examine the advisory opinion mandate under established principles of
administrative law. Part IV suggests better alternatives to the advisory opinion
system to assuage the fears of the industry, while preserving the potency and
legitimacy of OIG's enforcement mechanisms.
I. THE CURRENT HEALTH CARE ENVIRONMENT
A. Shift in Goals from Accessibility to Cost Containment
As mentioned before, Medicare and Medicaid were enacted to address
problems of inequity of access to health care services. As more and more
people utilize professional health services, overall expenditures have escalated
a Medicare recipient. Dr. John will be tempted to order more tests, to be performed at his
new hospital, in the hope that the benefits will trickle down. This rather alarmist hypothetical
is all too reflective of reality. See id. Courts have also noticed this phenomenon. See, e.g.,
United States v. Ruttenberg, 625 F.2d 173, 177 n.9 (7th Cir. 1980) ("Congress need not spell
out obvious truisms... [that] kickback schemes... misdirect program funds... and
... can erect strong temptations to order more drugs and supplies [and services] than
needed.").
12 See irnfra Part I.A.




dramatically. 14 Predictably, in light of the escalating costs of health care, the
debate has shifted focus in recent years from promoting access and quality to
finding ways to contain the cost and overall expenditures of health care.15
While concerns about access still exist, the new focus seems to emphasize
establishing proper market incentives to conserve public monies and slow the
rapid inflation of health care costs. 16
Despite wide public and governmental concern, cutting health care costs
has proved to be an uphill battle. A major contributor to the problem is the
structure of the system itself, which tends to promote cost-enhancing behavior
on the part of providers. This is partially because our system of health care has,
to date, existed outside of pure-competitive economic models. 17 Historically,
price-conscious consumers have not met with competitive suppliers.' 8 The fact
that a large portion of costs are supplemented by third-party payers (insurance)
reduces consumer cost consciousness and further removes the health care
market from typical supply-demand markets.19 Add to this the nature of the
doctor-patient relationship, where the patient typically submits to whatever tests
or treatments the doctor might prescribe,20 and you have a system ripe for cost-
enhancing behavior. 21 One of the cost-enhancing behaviors engaged in by
14 See James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan, Redefining Governnent's Role in Health
Care: Is a Dose of Competition What the Doctor Should Order?, 34 VAtN. L. REv. 849,
850-51 (1981).
15 See id. at 851.
16 See id. at 852.
17 The structure of the health services market deviates significantly from classic
competitive market models. The purely competitive model, in which price is set by supply
and demand, is not reflected in the health care market. In essence, the health care market has
been dominated by cost-enhancing, noncompetitive structures and incentives. See McDowell,
supra note 1, at 700; T.R. Marmor et al., Medical Care and Procompetitive Refonn, 34
VAND. L. Ruv. 1003, 1003 (1981).
18 See McDowell, supra note 1, at 700.
19 See id. Broad, comprehensive insurance coverage for both routine and complex
medical care is seen as encouraging the provision of services without a balancing of the costs
and benefits of such services. This situation undercuts rational economic decisionmaking by
consumers. See also Rand E. Rosenblatt, Health Care, Markets, and Democratic Values, 34
.VAND. L. REv. 1067, 1088-1103 (1981).
2 0 See Randall R. Bovbjerg, Competition Versus Regulation in Medical Care: An
Overdrawn Dichotomy, 34 VAND. L. REv. 965, 967-68 (1981) (discussing the view that
medical care is a technical process in which providers are experts and consumers are largely
ignorant). The bottom line of the market structure is not healthy from a cost control
perspective. The doctor can influence a patient to drive up costs which increase the doctor's
profits.
2 1 Studies confinm that physicians have the ability to "create demand" for their services.
See McDowell, supra note 1, at 702.
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providers is fraudulently taking advantage of the Medicare system.22 By some
estimates, the Medicare system loses up to one billion dollars a year to fraud.
23
Congress's main tools for battling fraud in the Medicare system are the
anti-fraud and abuse amendments, introduced in 1972.24 Among these
provisions, the paramount tool for combating modem Medicare fraud tactics is
the anti-kickback statute.25 In keeping with the times, these statutes are focused
on reducing costs because a stream of referrals is generally assumed to lead in
overutilization of services, which in turn drains the Medicare system. Despite
aggressive enforcement efforts under the anti-kickback statute, the federal
government believes that its fraud and abuse controls have failed to keep pace
with the industry's more complicated financial arrangements which often
cleverly disguise kickback arrangements. 26 The tendency for some providers to
commit fraud derogates from the government's overall goal of cost containment
in health care.
B. The Industry Trend Toward Managed Care: Joint Ventures
It is easy to see that the health care industry is changing dramatically. One
22 See i. at 713-14. History teaches us that it has been easy for health care providers to
take advantage of the system. When Medicare was started, it operated on a retrospective
payment system (meaning Medicare reimbursed the reported cost of services) which
encouraged providers to increase both the quantity and scope of services and created few
incentives to economize. See id. An important step was taken in 1983 toward the goal of cost
containment when Medicare switched from a retrospective to a prospective payment system.
See id. at 703. While this system does introduce cost-saving incentives into the market, it does
little to combat fraud.
23 See Martha J. Yoakum, Comment, Physician Fraud in the Medicare-Medicaid
Programs-Kickbacks, Bribes, and Remunerations, 10 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 684, 685
(1980) (citing 123 CoNG. REc. S16011 (1977)).
24 See Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 242(b), 86 Stat. 1329, 1419 (1972).
25 Kickbacks have become the prevalent form of fraud in part due to a switch in
reimbursement systems. In 1983, Congress went from the retrospective payment system to
the prospective payment system, which reimburses providers only for the reasonable costs
associated with their patients' particular maladies. See Social Security Amendments of 1983,
Pub. L. No. 98-21, §§ 601-607, 97 Stat. 65, 149-72 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1994)).
This system encourages providers to keep costs down. But the opportunity for fraud now
exists in volume and kickbacks, not in classical overbilling. Physicians will pay (or get paid)
money to send referrals to other physicians or to hospitals, which increases the volume of
business of the beneficiary of the referral and creates opportunities to collect Medicare finds.
There is strong evidence that referring physicians receive benefits in various forms (e.g.,
kickbacks) for those referrals. See Janos & Niewenhous, supra note 8, at 8. This financial
incentive encourages overutilization. Thus, fraud and abuse control now focuses on shutting
down these streams of referrals for kickbacks. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a (1994).
26 See Janos & Niewenhous, supra note 8, at 8.
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commentator notes:
"The health care industry has totally changed. What started with the Clinton
bear market a couple of years ago in drugs is now a managed-care revolution
in the U.S., and it's beginning to spill over into Europe.... We have, really,
a worldwide revolution occurring in health care, which is a $2.5 trillion
industry. And that revolution is the economic rationalization of the health-care
industry. Every company has to change its ways to live in an environment of
cost containment, consolidation, and rationalization. It's the biggest thing that
has happened to health care in our lifetimes." 27
Physicians and health care organizations are rapidly forming joint
ventures28 to compete for valuable managed care contracts. 29 Diverse suppliers
have united by pooling capital and sharing space, equipment, and personal or
managerial services. 30 The individual players in the health care industry have
started to realize that they can better survive by cooperating, rather than by
competing. 31
A look at the increasingly competitive market uncovers the advantages of
cooperation.32 Health care providers (hospitals and physicians) seek joint
ventures for a myriad of reasons. Among the most common are new revenues,
increase in market share through streams of referrals, establishment of multi-
27 Kathryn M. Welling, Going Bottom Fishing: To Do Otherwise Is to Miss the Health-
Care Reform Boat, Analyst Insists, BARRON'S, Nov. 25, 1996, at 26 (quoting David H.
Talbot, president of HealthReform Partners).
28 The term "joint venture" is normally defined quite broadly to include relationships
ranging from simple contracts to complex multi-party arrangements. Under federal tax law, a
joint venture has four elements: an express or implied agreement to form, the contribution of
money or services, an agreement for joint control, and profit sharing agreements. See Robert
A. Metry, Physician Ventures, C472 ALI-ABA Course of Study 509, 511 (1990).
29 See Latham Williams, Structuring Managed Care Contracts, HEALTIH CARE FIN.
MGMT., Aug. 1, 1995, at 32.
30 See David M. Frankford, Creating and Dividing the Fruits of Collective Economic
Activity: Referrals Among Health Care Providers, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1861, 1865-66
(1989).
31 One commentator notes: "'In the health-care industry, in general, there's a lot of very
needless and senseless allocation of resources in competing with each other as opposed to
rationally figuring out what's in the best interest of the community.'" Angela Gonzales,
Merger Means Mega Health-Care Network, Bus. J. PHOENIX & VA=LEY SuN, Nov. 15,
1996, at 25 (quoting Kaylor Schemberger, president and CEO of East Valley Regional Health
System of Chandler, Arizona).
32 Traditionally, hospitals were at the core of health care expenditures. Today, hospitals
are now experiencing a threat to their financial stability due to Medicare's prospective
payment system, price competition from alternative delivery systems such as HMOs, and an




disciplinary practices, access to expertise, and general economies of scale. 33 A
properly managed joint venture can drastically decrease administrative
overhead. 34 These cost savings are crucial to health care providers as the
regulatory environment clamps down on costs, and providers have to shift to
increased volume and cost-control to maintain profitability. As the market gets
tighter, it is logical to assume that joint ventures will continue to proliferate, and
eventually will be the dominant structure for health care providers.
C. The Impact of the Anti-Kickback Statute on Joint Ventures
As one might expect, the anti-kickback statute has a very direct effect on
joint ventures between health care providers. One of the prominent reasons
physicians and hospitals enter into joint ventures is to gain access to a pool of
patients-a stream of referrals35 to increase the volume of their business.
Because the anti-kickback statute has been less than clear in its application, joint
venturers have had a difficult time assessing their risk of prosecution under the
statute.
1. The Development of the Anti-Kickback Statute
Unveiled in 1972, the original anti-kickback statute made it a crime to
solicit, receive, offer, or pay any kickback, bribe, or rebate in return for
referrals. 36 Battling adversaries quickly convinced the courts that ambiguities
existed, upon which developed a split of authority, engendering immediate
33 See Metry, supra note 28, at 512.
34 This results from economies of scale in physical plants (e.g., medical buildings),
maintenance, insurance, and administrative assistants (e.g., secretaries). When physicians
form joint ventures, senseless duplication of these cost factors can be reduced. See Cathy
Tokarski, Learning from Experience: Mercy Health System, a Regional System, Bought More
than 200 Physician Practices to Fend Off Competition, AM. MED. NEWs, Dec. 9, 1996, at
21.
35 Referral streams (e.g., between physicians and hospitals or specialists) that carry
potential kickbacks may seem innocuous enough at first glance. However, referral streams
carry significant cost-enhancing potential. See Hugh E. Aaron, Application of the Medicare
and Medicaid Anti-Kickback Statute to Business Arrangements Between Hospitals and
Hospital-Based Physicians, 1 ANNALS HEALTH L. 53, 55-57 (1992). First, they can result in
the provision of unnecessary medical services, known as "overutilization," which drives up
costs to the patient, and thus Medicare. See id. at 56. This can often have detrimental effects
on patients' health, as patients are exposed to tests and treatments that they may not really
need. See id. Second, referral-kickback arrangements add another layer of "profit" to the cost
of an item or service, which gets passed on to the patient, and thus to Medicare. See id.
Finally, these arrangements tend to restrict patients' freedom of choice, as doctors refer
patients to co-venturers for services. See id.
3 6 Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 242(b), 86 Stat. 1329, 1419 (1972).
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confusion as to the reach of the statute.37 In early cases, courts primarily
focused on the definitions of the terms "bribe" and "kickback." The federal
circuits differed as to whether the terms should be construed narrowly (e.g.,
cash only, obviously for a referral)38 or broadly (to include all forms of
remuneration). 39
The 1972 statute was ultimately unsuccessful in reducing fraud in the
Medicare and Medicaid systems. A series of hearings conducted after its
enactment found that shocking levels of fraud were still rampant within the
system.40 The congressional findings, coupled with public outrage over
fraudulent activities, resulted in what one commentator described as a "fraud
and abuse crisis. "41 Conviction under the anti-kickback statute tended to turn on
whether the court adopted a narrow or broad view of the terms "bribe" and
"kickback." 42 The uncertainty of the statute's application, coupled with the
37 For the description of the development of anti-kickback laws, this author draws
heavily from a recently published treatise on the subject. See ImOTHY S. JOST & SHARON L.
DAvIEs, MEDICARE AND MEDIcAm FRAUD AND ABUsE 81-169 (1997) (discussing the history
and development of the anti-kickback laws).
38 See, e.g., United States v. Porter, 591 F.2d 1048 (5th Cir. 1979). In its first case
under the statute, the court in Porter adopted a narrow view of the terms. The case involved a
doctor who referred Medicare patients' blood samples to a particular lab. See id. at 1051. The
lab paid the doctor a "handling fee." See id. The court found no basis for characterizing the
payments as bribes and defined "kickback" as the "secret return to an earlier possessor of
part of a sum received." Id. at 1054. See also United States v. Zacher, 586 F.2d 912 (2d Cir.
1978) (relying on a narrow interpretation of the term "bribe" to reverse a conviction under the
anti-kickback statute).
39 In United States v. Hancock, the Seventh Circuit rejected the Porter opinion and
instead adopted a broad interpretation of the word "kickback." United States v. Hancock, 604
F.2d 999, 1002 (7th Cir. 1979). In Hancock, the defendant chiropractors sent blood and tissue
samples to a certain lab for testing and received payments for the referrals. See id. at 1001.
They claimed that the payments they received were "handling fees" based on Porter. See id.
The court affirmed the conviction, finding "kickback" to include "a percentage
payment.., for granting assistance by one in a position to open up or control a source of
income." Id. at 1002 (citing Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1966)). The
defendants opened up a source of income to the labs, and the labs paid them, which was
enough for the court. "The potential for increased costs to the... system... is plain, where
payments for the [referrals] are added to the legitimate costs of the transaction." Id. at 1001.
This "potential for increased costs" rationale was followed in United States v. Ruttenberg,
625 F.2d 173 (7th Cir. 1980).
40 Congress found that so-called "medicaid mills," clinics that provided services to
essentially anyone armed with a Medicaid number, accounted for a disproportionate amount
of Medicaid claims and were major cost centers for the program. H.R. REP. No. 95-393, pt.
2, at 45-46 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3039, 3047-48.
41 Harvey E. Pies, Control of Fraud and Abuse in Medicare and Medicaid, 3 AM. J. L.
& MED. 323, 328 (1977).
42 See McDowell, supra note 1, at 718.
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rampant fraud problem, led to a revision of the statute in 1977. 43 The
amendments reflect the Seventh Circuit's approach, replacing the terms "bribe"
and "kickback" with the catch-all term "remuneration. " 44 Also, the
amendments added a "knowingly and willfully" requirement. 45
While the amendments did away with the controversy over kickback
definitions, the scienter requirement created yet another split of authority in
federal courts. The Third Circuit ruled that if at least one purpose of a payment
was to induce referrals, then the "knowing and willful" requirement was
satisfied.46 The First Circuit held, on the same issue, that in order to satisfy the
"knowing and willful" requirement for a conviction, the government must
prove that the primary purpose of the payment was to induce referrals.47 The
Ninth Circuit recently adopted a completely different approach to scienter in
Hanlester Network v. Shalala.48 Creating a high hurdle for the government to
clear on its way to winning convictions under the anti-kickback statute, the
court held that the defendants must (1) know that the statute prohibits the
payment made for referral, and (2) engage in the prohibited conduct with the
specific intent to break the law.49 This heightened threshold may hinder
prosecutions under the anti-kickback law, as it possibly makes ignorance of the
law a viable defense. Moreover, a defendant may in good faith rely on the
advice of counsel and immunize himself from prosecution. 50
Congress amended the statute once again in 1987. The most significant
aspect of these amendments is Congress's order to the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) to develop "safe harbor" regulations specifying
certain payment practices not subject to criminal prosecution under the anti-
kickback law. 51 Congress ordered these regulations in response to the uncertain
interpretation of the statute that was developing in the courts. 52 In response to
Congress's directive, HIS's Office of the Inspector General (OIG)
promulgated regulations containing eleven safe harbor provisions.53 If conduct
4 3 See Medicare-Medicaid Fraud and Abuse Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-142, §§ 4(a),
4(b), 91 Stat. 1175, 1181 (1977).
44 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a)(1) (1994).
45 See id. at § 1320a-7(a)(2).
46 See United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1985).
4 7 See United States v. Bay State Ambulance, 874 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1989).
48 51 F.3d 1390 (9th Cir. 1995).
4 9 See id. at 1400.
50 See Janos & Niewenhous, supra note 8, at 9.
51 See id.
52 See id.
53 The safe harbor provisions give protection to the following arrangements: (1)
"Investment [i]nterests," (2) "Space [r]ental," (3) "Equipment rental," (4) "Personal services
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complies with every element of a safe harbor provision, then it will not be
subject to criminal prosecution. 54 Arrangements not completely in compliance
are not guaranteed protection, but of course are not guaranteed to be in
violation either.55 Most business arrangements will not mechanically fulfill all
of that given safe harbor provision's elements. 56 This means that most joint
venturers, while they may be close to fulfilling all of the elements of a safe
harbor, will seldom be guaranteed freedom from prosecution.
2. The Special Problem with Joint Ventures
As discussed above in Part I.B, there is a major migration in the health care
industry toward managed care, which involves inter alia the formation of joint
ventures between hospitals and physicians. One obvious benefit and motivating
factor for hospitals to establish these agreements is the likelihood that the
physician will increase the use of her partner hospital as she sends her patients
there for services. The problem in terms of the anti-kickback statute is that often
an acknowledged intent of these ventures is to increase the hospital's referral
stream.57 The conflicting and sometimes quite broad interpretations of the
statute leave many potential joint venturers wondering if they are about to break
the law. 58 The dilemma confronting venturing parties is this: Is there any
meaningful way to distinguish between fraudulent practices and legitimate
business agreements? The unresolved split on the scienter requirement
("knowing and willful") adds to the uncertainty.59 Experience with "safe
harbors" has showed the industry that "providing clear, authoritative guidance
as to what payment practices are permitted under [the anti-kickback provisions
is]... a more difficult and tedious task for OIG than Congress may have
and management contracts," (5) "Sale of practice," (6) "Referral services," (7)
"Warranties," (8) "Discounts," (9) "Employees," (10) "Group purchasing organizations,"
and (11) "Waiver of beneficiary coinsurance and deductible amounts." Medicare and State
Health Care Programs: Fraud and Abuse; OIG Anti-Kickback Provisions, 56 Fed. Reg.
35952, 35984-87 (1991) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001) [hereinafter Anti-Kickback
Provisions]. While a detailed discussion of each of these provisions is outside the scope of this
Comment, suffice it to say that these do not begin to cover the myriad of structures that are
used in creating joint ventures today.
54 See Aaron, supra note 35, at 63.
55 See id.
56 See id.
57 See McDowell, supra note 1, at 739.
58 See Aaron, supra note 35, at 53-54 (noting that "the anti-kickback statute could easily
be interpreted to prohibit a wide range of traditionally accepted business arrangements
involving healthcare providers").




All of this uncertainty under the anti-kickback statutes leaves potential joint
venturers to twist in the wind. Many payment practices, while not appearing to
violate the spirit of the anti-kickback statute, will still fall outside the guarantees
of safe harbor protection, leaving providers in a legal gray area where it is
difficult to assess their exposure to prosecution. 6' The health care industry is
concerned that the anti-kickback statutes have a chilling effect on the formation
of new, honest, legitimate business enterprises. 62
II. OIG's ATrEMPTS TO ADVISE, LEADING TO THE PASSAGE OF THE
ADVISORY OPINION MANDATE IN HIPAA
A. OIG's Early Guidance Efforts
One can hardly blame the health care industry for being confused about the
anti-kickback statute. The statute itself is a challenging read even for those with
a legal education and has been subject to various interpretations by the courts.63
The existing safe harbor provisions are equally complex and are widely known
to be narrowly applied.64 The industry is concerned that a joint venture, formed
in good faith to comply with the statute, may nevertheless violate the technical
terms of the statute and expose the venturing parties to criminal sanctions. With
the increasingly rapid formation of joint ventures, it is clear that further
guidance to the health care industry from the relevant authorities65 is desirable
in order to protect good faith actors.
OIG has had some difficulty providing guidance. Some early advisory
opinions were written on OIG's own initiative in 1980 and 1981. In 1991,
however, OIG announced that it would stop issuing advisory opinions on the
ground that the interpretation of criminal statutes was a matter best left to the
60 Richard S. Saver, Proposed Safe Harbor Regulations Clarfy a Few Issues, Leave
Others Unresolved, 11 HEALTHSPAN 20, 20 (1994). The safe harbor provisions have been
criticized for their failure to provide meaningful guidance on the reach of the anti-kickback
statute. See id. at 22.
61 See id. at 22.
62 See McDowell, supra note 1, at 727.
63 To this day, federal courts are still divided over what the requisite level of intent must
be to convict a person or entity under the anti-kickback statute. See supra notes 45-49 and
accompanying text.
64 Only full compliance with each element of the safe harbor pmvisions guarantees
freedom from prosecution. See Aaron, supra note 35, at 63.
65 The relevant authorities are the Office of Inspector General (OIG) of the Department




judiciary. 66 The early advisory opinions have been explicitly rendered dicta by
IHfS. HI-IS has made it known that no person associated with HI-IS,
intermediaries, or carriers has ever been authorized to permit a practice that is
illegal under the anti-kickback statute. 67 HHS has also made it clear that HI-IS is
unable to render legal advice on the application of the statute to individual fact
situations.68 The agency has explicitly stated that "the so-called advisory letters
may not be regarded in any way as authoritative. "69
According to HIlS, to render responses to requests (possibly with a binding
effect) on the application of the criminal anti-kickback statute to individual
businesses would violate the exclusive authority vested in the Department of
Justice (DOJ) to enforce all criminal laws of the United States. 70 HI-S also
pointed out that any response would be of limited value due to the fact-intensive
and inherently subjective nature of any inquiry into a party's intent to violate
the statute.71
OIG also tried to issue informal advice in the form of "intermediary letters"
which were sent to fiscal intermediaries to help them understand the statute.
One letter is of particular relevance in the realm of joint ventures. In this
particular letter, OIG set up a hypothetical agreement between a durable
medical equipment supplier and a physician.72 The agreement involved
payment of "finders fees" to the physician for referrals to the supplier of
patients in need of durable equipment.73 The letter concluded that the
arrangement violated the statute.74 A few months later OIG withdrew the letter,
66 See Anti-Kickback Provisions, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,952, 35,959, 35,960 (1991) (to be
codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 1001).
67 See id. at 35,959.
68 See id.
69 Id. at 35,960.
70 See id. at 35,959. Courts have consistently ratified this rule. See United States v.
Wong Kim Bo, 466 F.2d 1298, 1302 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that the decision to prosecute is
the exclusive responsibility of the Attorney General); United States v. Kysar, 459 F.2d 422
(10th Cir. 1972); Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243, 247 (5th Cir. 1967). If HHS
immunized a particular agreement, the resulting conflict with DOJ's authority to initiate or
decline to initiate charges is clear.
71 See Anti-Kickback Provisions, 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,959.
72 See Payments to Respiratory Therapists by Double Medical Eqapment Supplier and
the Illegal Remuneration Provisions of the Social Security Act, OIG intermediary letter No.
84-9 (Sept. 1984), reprinted in Suppliers of Durable Medical Equipment Offering "Finders"
and "Referral" Fees, [May 1984-Dec. 1984 Transfer Binder, New Developments]





explaining that the legality of particular arrangements could not be determined
without consideration of the relevant factors and practice patterns. 75 The short
life of this letter is a testament to the inherent difficulty in determining a party's
subjective intent.76
HITS has struggled to provide guidance to the industry regarding the reach
of the anti-kickback statute.77 The statute is particularly relevant to hospitals and
physicians wishing to engage in a joint venture.78 Given the explosive growth
of joint venture agreements in the modem managed-care environment, the
industry wants for guidance more than ever.79
B. Congress to the Rescue?
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(HIPAA)80 primarily deals with portability. The statute refers to "portability" in
its dictionary sense-something that can be carried around from place to place.
The statute seeks, inter alia, to make health insurance "portable" for Americans
who switch jobs. Under the statute's portability provisions,8 ' when individuals
75 See OIG memorandum No. B-85-2 (Apr. 1985), reprinted in Suppliers of Durable
Medical Equipment Offering "Finders" and "Referrals" Fees, [Dec. 1984-July 1985 Transfer
Binder, New Developments] MEDICARE AND MEICAm GuiDE (CCI) 34,544 (Apr. 1985).
76 In a 1988 solicitation for ideas to improve the anti-fraud scheme, OIG noted the
problems associated with trying to give pre-dispute advice on the anti-kickback statute in an
advisory opinion-type mechanism:
We should note that questions have been raised regarding the practicality and
effectiveness of such an approach given that often an assessment of circumstances (1)
cannot be accurately made based solely on a written presentation, (2) could divert limited
resources from enforcement efforts, and (3) could be used to impede subsequent cases
against other parties.
53 Fed. Reg. 51,856, 51,857 (1988).
77 See discussion supra Part II.A.
78 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
79 See supra Part I.B.
80 Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29,
and 42 U.S.C.) [hereinafter HIPAA].
81 See HIPAA tit. I (codified in scattered sections of 29 and 42 U.S.C.). Congress's
chief concern in passing HIPAA was portability. Increased portability has several advantages
for working Americans:
Above all, the goal of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act continues
to be the implementation of the very basic reforms of portability and limits on pre-
existing conditions. These reforms represent what we all support and are important to
the many people who experience a sense ofjob-lock or pre-existing conditions.
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change jobs, their health insurance should go with them. HIPAA was designed
with a specific goal in mind: to create portability despite having pre-existing
conditions, being fired, or otherwise changing jobs.82 Fraud reduction is also
one of the purposes of HIPAA, as evidenced by its preamble: "An act
to... improve portability and continuity of health insurance coverage in the
group and individual markets, to combat waste, fraud, and abuse in health
insurance and health care delivery .... 83 As part of HIPAA's fraud and
abuse control scheme, Congress created an advisory opinion mandate requiring
OIG to give advice to providers on a number of issues, including whether any
activity constitutes grounds for the imposition of a sanction under the anti-
142 CONG. REC. S10564-65 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1996) (statement of Sen. Frist)
The "job-lock" effect, that a worker will be afraid to change jobs for fear of losing
health insurance, was one of the main problems HIPAA was designed to remedy:
Victory can be expressed by workers, who currently can see a new opportunity for
themselves and their families by moving up in terms of the employment opportunities but
hesitate to do so. They hesitate to attempt to fulfill the great American dream because
they wonder whether that job which is out there and offered to them in which they feel
they can do a superior job may not provide that degree of [health care] coverage for a
member of their family, for their [spouse] or for one of their children. As a result, they
turn down that opportunity. The American dream becomes somewhat more remote and
distant to them.
142 CoNG. REC. S9501-02 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
82 Most of the debate on this bill focused on the portability provisions. This is an
interesting phenomenon because the portability provisions were given universal support. Why
would members of Congress continually and repetitively speak during debate on an
uncontested issue? Most likely the legislators wanted their names attached on the right side of
a politically popular issue. A very politically favorable piece of legislation, HIPAA was
heralded as a victory for working Americans. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REc. E1485 (daily ed.
Aug. 2, 1996) (statement of Rep. Bentsen). Representative Bentsen heralded HIPAA as
exactly the kind of assistance the American people want and need to address the
challenges they face in their daily lives.... [HIPAA] will give peace of mind to
millions of families without imposing new costs on businesses and
government .... This is an example of whaL Congress can do when we put common
sense and the public interest first.
Id. Indeed, most of the record consists of legislators lauding the portability provisions as a
major health care breakthrough, despite the fact that not a single member of either house of
Congress raised a single objection to the bill's portability provisions. Thus, the debate was
relatively fruitless and pointless from a substantive point of view. Not focused on clearing up
disagreements, the debate was more useful to individual members as a chance to impress their
constituents. Apparently, it was a positive political move in the 1996 election year to jump on
the portability bandwagon. In the end, the bill passed the House 421-2 and the Senate 98-0.
See, e.g., 142 CONG. REc. S9501 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1996).
83 HIPAA pmbl., 110 Stat. at 1936.
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kickback provision. 84 Though the record is sparse in relation to the motivation
behind this provision, it is clear that the advisory opinion mandate was
designed, at least in part, to provide guidance to joint-venturing parties. 85 The
statute reads, in relevant part:
(b) ADVSORY OPIoN.-
(1) ISSUANCE OF ADVISORY OPINION.-The Secretary, in consultation
with the Attorney General, shall issue written advisory opinions as provided in
this subsection.
(2) MATrERS SUBJECr TO ADVISORY OPINION.-The Secretary shall issue
advisory opinions as to the following matters:
(A) What constitutes prohibited remuneration within the meaning of
section 1128(B)(b).
(E) Whether any activity or proposed activity constitutes grounds for
the imposition of a sanction under section 1128, 1128A, or 1128B.
(4) EFFECr OF ADVISORY OPINION.-
(A) BINDING AS TO SECRzTARY AND PARTIES INVOLVED.-Each
advisory opinion issued by the Secretary shall be binding as to the
Secretary and the party or parties requesting the opinion.
(B) FAiLURE TO SEEK OPINION.-The failure of a party to seek an
advisory opinion may not be introduced into evidence to prove that the
party intended to violate the provisions of sections 1128, 1128A, or
84 See HIPAA tit. II, § 205(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7d (West Supp. 1997).
85 Trying to define the rationale behind HIPAA's advisory opinion mandate is
speculative, as the legislative history is relatively barren of discussion of the issue. Not a
single member of Congress spoke to the issue of why the mandate was a positive step in the
fight against fraud and abuse. The few comments on the provision were negative, focusing on
the negative impact the mandate would have on fraud and abuse control efforts. See, e.g., 142
CONG. REC. H9790 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1996) (statement of Rep. Dingell). See also infra Part
Hm. One possibility is that the Medicaid lobby was in favor of the provision and influenced its
passage. Considering the trend in the health care industry toward joint venture arrangements,
see supra Part I.B, combined with the uncertain application of the anti-kickback statute to
those arrangements, see supra Part I.C, it is easy to envision the health care lobby clamoring
for help from Congress. See 142 CONG. REc. S9477, S9478 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1996)
(statement of Sen. Heflin) ("This measure enjoys... support... from a host of
organizations, including... the American Medical Association, [and] the American Hospital
Association .... Virtually every medical group in the country has endorsed this bill .. ").
Special interests have power to influence legislation, and it is possible that special interests
provided the impetus for the advisory opinion mandate. For a commentary on the potency of
special interest groups in the legislative process, see WIIpmD E. Bn-m.EY & MALCOiM C.
Moos, A GRAMMAR OF AmERCAN PoLrrIcs 7-8 (2d rev. ed. 1952). In the end, those special
interests are bound to be disappointed by the advisory opinion mandate. While the advisory
opinions may seem to provide meaningful guidance to joint venturers, the forthcoming




The statute requires that the advisory opinion be issued no later than sixty
days after the request is received.8 7 Viewed solely from the point of view of
joint venturing parties, this statute is a great deal. Joint venturing parties can get
speedy yet binding advice from the agency. 88 They can get this advice at
relatively little expense.89 Upon their request, the providers will know whether
the agency will have grounds to prosecute them. They may to some extent be
able to rely on these opinions against prosecution by the Department of
Justice. 90 At first glance, the statute seems to give potential joint venturers what
they want.
IM. THE NEGATIVE REGULATORY IMPACT OF IIIPAA's ADVISORY
OPINION PROCESS
A. Financial Burden and Other Familiar Agency Objections to Issuing
Advisory Opinions Under the Anti-Kickback Statute: The Obvious
Dangers
While at first glance this mandate may seem to properly address a growing
concern in the health care industry, this provision is certainly not as innocuous
86 HIPAA tit. II, § 205(b), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7d (West Supp. 1997).
87 See HIPAA tit. II, § 205(b)(5)(B)(i), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7d (West Supp. 1997).
88 This receipt of advice contrasts with waiting for the agency to promulgate more
detailed rules according to the strict procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure
Act. See infra Part II.B.
89 OIG can recover no more than its actual cost. See HIPAA tit. II, § 205(b)(5)(B)Cii),
42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7d (West Supp. 1997).
90 Other agencies have procedures that allow for advisory opinion-type guidance
mechanisms. One example is the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) no-action
letter. SEC may issue a no-action letter where it feels it is appropriate. A no-action letter is
one where an authorized SEC Staff Official indicates that the Staff will not recommend any
enforcement action to the Commission if the proposed transaction described in the incoming
correspondence is consummated. See Richard H. Rowe, Reliance on SEC Staff "No Action"
Letters-A Shield or a Sword?, in OPinrONs IN SEC T ANsACirONs 667, 679-80 (PLI Corp.
Law & Practice Handbook Series No. 896, 1995). Commentators have suggested that there is
often a reliance defense available based on published no-action letters, even to third parties.
See id. at 681-88 (analyzing a "hierarchy" of no-action positions and the varying degree to
which the public can rely on no-action positions). From the SEC example, it would stand to
reason that reliance theories may be spun from advisory opinions. Thus, Inspector General of
EuS June Gibbs Brown's fears that advisory opinions may lead to third party reliance and
same party reliance to avoid criminal prosecution appear to have some substance. See Letter
from June Gibbs Brown, Inspector General of HHS, to Sen. Tom Harkin (Sept. 29, 1995), in
141 CONG. REC. S15158, S15159 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1995).
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as it may seem. First of all, it requires a speedy response to every request from
the public, which will put quite a drain on OIG's budget.91 Also, HIPAA did
not address H-IS's reasoning for abandoning the issuance of advisory opinions
back in 1981. The advisory opinions contemplated by HIPAA are the same as
the advisory opinions issued under the anti-kickback statutes in the early 1980s,
which I-HS found to be totally inadequate to provide meaningful advice on the
intent-based anti-kickback statute.92 Despite these well-known concerns, the
provision caught the attention of very few members of Congress during
HIPAA's debates. The few meager minutes that were spent on the issue simply
regurgitated the fears brought to light by OIG during the past fifteen years. Not
a single legislator put forth a theory in defense of the advisory opinion
mandate.
9 3
Sporadically during HIPAA's debate, as well as in debates on earlier forms
of the bill, a member of Congress would attempt to directly face the issue of the
advisory opinions. More than once, the comments either directly referred to or
mirrored concerns that were expressed by HHS's Inspector General in a letter
91 See infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
92 See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
93 The curious state of affairs in Congress at the time of the bill's debates may have had
an impact on this provision's successful passage. August 2, 1996 was approximately ninety
days before the election. This bill was a very public affair-a major success to help our
nation's health care crisis, just in time for November's popularity contest. As a result, a
substantial amount of election-year politics infiltrated the debate. In the House, for example,
the greatest amount of attention was paid to the advisory opinion mandate on a motion to
recommit the bill to committee. See 142 CONG. REc. H9786 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1996)
(statement of Rep. Stark). The charge to recommit was led by Representative Stark, who is
one of the leading authorities in Congress on Medicare and Medicaid fraud and abuse. See id.
"The bill's anti-fraud provisions are bad. The advisory opinions on intent based fraud cases
are unprecedented, and the Justice Department-IHS's Inspector General strongly oppose
them.... [The mandate's lack of funding for OIG's advisory role] devastates the agency's
ability to fight fraud that they talk about." Id. Another representative attacked the provision as
an attempt at logrolling by the Republican Party: "While this legislation does some good
things, at least one of the things it does needs to be examined. My good Republican friends
have tucked away a couple of nice little provisions here which will hinder the fight against
fraud and abuse." 142 CONG. REC. H9790 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Dingell, discussing the advisory opinion mandate). When the motion to recommit was called
to question, it failed by a relatively narrow margin, 228-198. This shows there was some real
concern with the issues raised. But when the conference report itself was called to question,
those fears took a back seat to the political pressure of getting behind popular health care
reform. It seems that although many members of Congress had misgivings about some
provisions, only two legislators (in both houses) could resist jumping on the bandwagon. The
bill passed the House 421-2, and passed the Senate 98-0. It seems that election politics may
have played a role in the advisory opinion mandate passing so easily, with so little meaningful
debate. Though 198 legislators felt the bill needed significant revision, only two would dare
go on record as voting against the popular health care reform measure.
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to Senator Tom Harkin.94 This letter nicely summarizes the arguments against
advisory opinions that have been considered to date. According to the letter,
industry efforts to make OIG issue advisory opinions have been staunchly
resisted by both OIG and DOJ. There is no guarantee under HIPAA that the
fees paid by requesters will get back to OIG, which could result in a serious
drain on OIG's budget. The letter states the following as major problems with
advisory opinions under HIPAA:
Advisory opinions on intent-based statutes (such as the anti-kickback
statute) are impractical if not impossible. Because of the inherently subjective,
factual nature of intent, it would be impossible for HIHS to determine intent
based solely upon a written submission from the [requester]. Indeed, it does not
make sense for a [requester] to ask the Government to determine the
[requester's] own intent. ... .95
None of the 11 existing advisory opinion processes in the Federal
Government provide[s] advisory opinions regarding the issue of the
[requester's] intent. An advisory opinion process for an intent-based statute is
without precedent in U.S. law.
The advisory process ... would severely hamper the Government's
ability to prosecute health care fraud. Even with appropriate written caveats,
defense counsel will hold up a stack of advisory opinions before the jury and
claim that the defendant read them and honestly believed (however irrationally)
that he or she was not violating the law. The prosecution would have to
disprove this defense beyond a reasonable doubt. This will seriously affect the
likelihood of conviction of those offering kickbacks96
The letter goes on to highlight the financial problems OIG will
experience. 97 HHS is permanently downsizing, even as it faces massive
program and structural changes. The result of the advisory opinion mandate
would be to divert hundreds of already busy anti-fraud workers from their cases
94 See Letter from June Gibbs Brown, Inspector General of HHS, to Sen. Tom Harkin
(Sept. 29, 1995), in 141 CONG. RFC. S15159 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1995).
95 This problem becomes even worse when the split of authority over the intent element
of the statute is considered. Because the courts have differed, see supra notes 45-49 and
accompanying text, a finding of intent or no intent from the agency could be different than a
court's interpretation. If DOJ wished to prosecute an arrangement that HHI-S had immunized
(perhaps for a favorable result in a circuit that requires less intent than did the author of the
advisory opinion), then DOJ would likely meet a reliance defense based on the advisory
opinions.96 Letter from June Gibbs Brown, Inspector General of HI-S, to Sen. Tom Harkin
(Sept. 29, 1995), in 141 CONG. RFc. S15158, S15159 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1995).
97 "The Congressional Budget Office scored this advisory opinion provision as costing




to handle preparation of advisory opinions. 98 The few comments that were
made in HIPAA's debates regarding advisory opinions mostly raised concerns
that paralleled this letter.99 Thus, it should be noted that Congress was aware of
these particular concerns. However, these concerns were not enough to derail
the politically charged HIPAA. Whether the mandate would have passed on its
own merits is a question that involves trying to decipher what goes on in the
minds of members of Congress (a horrific exercise). It seems that in this case,
though the problems were occasionally referred to, the advisory opinion section
passed on the coattails of popular portability provisions that cut across party
lines. 1°° It is also clear that Congress failed to realize the position into which it
was forcing OIG. Not only does the mandate place a serious financial burden
on the agency, but it calls on an uncertain and uncomfortable mix of agency
functions, which will lead to results that are wholly at odds with fundamental
principles of administrative law.
B. The Strange Mixture of Agency Functions Called Upon by HIPAA's
Advisory Opinion Mandate Sends OIG "Shopping for Hats"
The arguments against issuing advisory opinions mentioned above (as
expressed in the letter from HI-IS's Inspector General to Senator Harkin)101
have been communicated to Congress since 1981. Despite these objections
98 See id.
99 See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S9501-01, S9511 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1996) (statement of
Sen. Cohen).
10 The record is littered with legislators lauding the bipartisan efforts to bring the
portability measure to fruition. For example:
[HIPAA] will reduce many of the existing barriers to obtaining health insurance
coverage by making it easier for people who change jobs or lose their jobs to maintain
adequate coverage. As many as 25 million Americans will be helped by this legislation,
since it protects portability and against losing insurance due to preexisting medical
conditions.
This measure enjoys wide bipartisan support in Congress and from a host of
organizations....
.. [HIPAA] ... is an example of the kind of incremental changes that can be
enacted step-by-step in a bipartisan, collegial manner. Hopefully, this will serve as a
model for future legislative reforms to our health care system and prompt the two sides
of the aisle to seek more ways of working together for the betterment of the Nation.
142 CONG. REc. S9477 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1996) (statement of Sen. Heflin).
101 See supra Part II.A.
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Congress passed IIIPAA with the advisory opinion mandate intact, and without
the mandate being carefully scrutinized. A closer look at the implications of
HIPAA reveals a larger, more serious flaw in Congress's command to OIG: a
lack of theoretical and practical support for the type of action Congress is
forcing OIG to take.
To appreciate the counter-theoretical results that flow from HIPAA's
advisory opinion mandate, one must first attempt to classify the type of agency
action it requires, and then see if that action can be harmonized with the
principles that have legitimized that type of action in other situations. IIIPAA's
advisory opinion mandate forces action that seems to exist outside of all major
legitimate paradigms for agency actions. 1°2 The difficulty in characterizing the
action HIPAA requires leads to difficulty in harmonizing the action with rule of
law principles.' 03 It is the lack of harmony between the action required by
HIPAA's mandate and the theories that usually support those actions that will
force OIG to go "shopping for hats."
1. Advisory Opinions as Traditional Rulemaking
It is fairly obvious that as it issues advisory opinions under HIPAA, OIG
cannot comfortably wear the hat of the rulemaker. 104 The advisory opinions
cannot be seen as being part of 1H-IS's traditional rulemaking function. First
and foremost, rulemaking is supposed to be general and prospective, applying
across the board to all potentially affected parties. Such rules aspire toward the
102 This author has identified three major agency functions: rulemaking, adjudication,
and advice-giving. Each function will be considered in tam. In the end, it will be clear that
HIPAA's mandate calls on a mixed bag of agency functions, exposing the agency to all of the
pitfalls inherent in those functions, yet providing few of the safeguards needed to harmonize
those functions with the rule of law principle.
103 Agency rulemaking comports with rule of law principles when the agency making
the rule complies with the Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.) (APA), and makes rules prospectively
and with public participation. Agency adjudication can be consistent with the rule of law if the
process ensures stable and accurate fact-finding, such that parties know what to expect. See
generally ALFRED C. AMAN, JR. & WILLiM T. MAYrON, ADmIisTAnvE LAW (1993).
Agencies have also developed advice-giving models that are consistent with the rule of law, in
that the more binding a given piece of advice will be, the more process (such as hearings and
publication) is involved. See Rowe, supra note 90, at 681 (explaining that the most reliable
breeds of no-action letters are published in the Federal Register or independent sources). A
mandate like HIPAA, which calls on a strange mix of agency functions, carries the danger
that the safeguards that usually bring that function within the rule of law will be lacking, and
thus the action itself will be "out of sync" with the rule of law principle.




rule of law principle, 10 5 a fundamental theory of American government. As
105 An integral part of the nature and theory of American government is that it aspires to
govern by the rule of law. By definition, the rule of law posits "government according to
standing rules [and principles] that [more] imparnially distribute the burdens and benefits of
government." AMAN & MAYroN, supra note 103, at 67 (emphasis added). The United States
Supreme Court has explicitly recognized the rule of law as fundamental to our theory of
government:
When we consider the nature and theory of our institutions of government, the principles
upon which they are supposed to rest, and review the history of their development, we
are constrained to conclude that they do not mean to leave room for the play of action of
purely personal and arbitrary power.
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369-70 (1886).
The most obvious-and oldest-manifestation of this principle is the doctrine of
separation of powers. Separation of powers promotes the rule of law because it militates
against concentration of power in any one person or body. A combination of power in the
same hands (for example, if a legislator also had adjudicative and executive powers)
approaches tyranny. See Tim FEDERAUSr No. 47 (James Madison). Under this view, when
one person or governmental body "wears too many hats" "it admits to ad hoc rule making,
not permanent and general laws but orders cut for the occasion... [which often spring] from
partial motives and [are] directed at private ends." AMAN & MAYrON, supra note 103, at 69-
70. Separation of powers, on the other hand, helps to move government within the rule of
law.
The eighteenth century has come and gone. Our complex and growing society has
outgrown a government of wholly discreet powers. To keep pace with the increasing demands
of modem government, agencies have assumed much of the duty of administering policies.
See id. at 68. "And so, government power has been combined in agencies for a more efficient
development of various government programs." Id. The courts have sanctioned this
delegation of power. See Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 15-16 (10 Wheat.) (1825) (stating
that "Congress can certainly delegate... powers it may rightfully exercise itself"). This
delegation is proper, particularly where the legislature has imperfect knowledge of a
substantive area and wants the policy to be developed by experts within an agency. This
delegation of legislative authority necessarily means that agencies must be given quasi-
legislative powers to promulgate rules. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). Of course, agencies also must have
adjudicative power to resolve disputes under the rules they promulgate. This combination of
powers provides the opportunity for ad hoc action (particular laws made for particular cases)
that separation of powers and the rule of law seek to retard. See AMAN & MAYroN, supra
note 103, at 68.
This modem commingling of powers in agencies does not necessarily mean that agency
action will violate the rule of law principle. "[F]reedom... under government," John Locke
said, "is to have a standing rule to live by, common to every one of that society...." JoHm
LOCKE, SECOND TREATSE OF GovmiEr 17 (Hackett 1980).
This statement of the rule of law principle shows that the theory has two basic
components: "The first part is the practical capacity of people to order [their] life and
business" around a readily available set of published rules. See AmAN & MAYrON, supra
note 103, at 69. The second part is that the rules should be general, equally applicable to all,
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agencies take on a more prominent role in administering policy, it is desirable
that their actions comport with the rule of law principle as well. 10 6 While it is
rather than according to the will of an official. See id.
The first part of this definition regarding capacity to plan has been recognized throughout
history as a fundamental aspect of the rule of law. See THE FEDERAUSr No. 62 (James
Madison) ("Law is defined to be a rule of action; but how can that be a rule, which is little
known and less fixed."). The Second Circuit had this principle in mind when it stated that the
Federal Trade Commission "owes a duty to define the conditions under which
conduct... would be unfair so that business will have an inkling as to what they can lawfully
do rather than be left in a state of complete unpredictability." E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.
v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 139 (2d Cir. 1984).
The second part of Locke's definition deals with equality. Rules should be made
generally and apply equally to all members of society. When all similarly situated people and
enterprises-regardless of their relative political pull-are subject to a general rule, the
nmlemaker must necessarily proceed with care and circumspection, with due regard to many
different interests outside of his own, in making the rule. See Railway Express Agency v.
New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949) (praising legislative generality). The requirements
of the APA can be viewed as Congress's attempt to make sure agencies take action according
to rule of law principles. See supra note 103 and infra note 106 and accompanying text.
106 Congress and the courts have kept rule of law aspirations in mind when delegating to
agencies, and safeguards have been established to protect that principle. See Railway Express
Agency, 336 U.S. at 112-13. Congress has done a good deal to legitimize agency actions by
passing the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1994). The APA prescribes certain procedures to
accompany agency rulemaking. It requires rules to be open to the public for comment, then
published in the Federal Register. See id. It also provides that "a person may not in any
manner be required to resort to, or be adversely affected by, a matter required to be published
in the Federal Register and not so published." Id. This part of rulemaking, as recognized by
the Supreme Court, is responsive to rule of law values. It "provides notice of what... will
be sanctioned and promotes equality of treatment among similarly situated [persons]." Dixon
v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 115 (1977). Thus, despite the concentration of power in agencies
(both to make and apply rules), agency action is brought closer to rule of law principles by the
stringent rulemaking requirements of the APA.
When an agency takes action according to the rulemaking procedures in the APA,
several concerns are addressed. Rulemaking, through the notice-and-comment requirements,
assures that a variety of interests will focus on a proposed policy shift and bring issues to the
political forefront. See Jim Rossi, Making Policy Through the Waiver of Regulations at the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 47 ADMIN. L. Rnv. 255, 294 (1995). In addition to
increasing public participation and fairness, notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures
assure that the agency is adequately informed as to the issues inherent in any proposed rule,
much like the deliberative process of legislators assures adequate coverage of issues. See
Committee on Fed. Regulation of See., Report on the Task Force on SEC Settlements, 47
Bus. LAw. 1083, 1143 (1992). Agency action through rulemaking also serves to legitimize
the agency action in the eyes of the public. See Chamber of Commerce of United States v.
OSHA, 636 F.2d 464, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (stating that public participation by those to be
affected by a rule "helps dispel suspicions of agency predisposition, unfadiess, arrogance,improper influence, and ulterior motivation"). So, although concentration of power in the
hands of an agency may appear to violate rule of law standards by inviting ad hoc policy
development, the APA helps bring agency action within the ambit of the rule of law.
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true that our government is not always able to reach its goal of governance
according to the rule of law, one should view with skepticism a statute that
forces agency action which has no hope of aspiring to the rule of law principle.
Generality, as opposed to specificity, is one of the chief factors legitimizing
the rulemaking process. 107 The specificity of the advisory opinion process,
applying law to specific parties in specific fact situations, quickly removes a
HIPAA-style advisory opinion from the realm of traditional rulemaking.
Moreover, HIPAA mandates that advisory opinions be issued without the
notice-and-comment procedures specified in the APA for rulemaking.108
HIPAA's advisory opinion mandate does not even attempt to harmonize the
issuance of advisory opinions with the APA's rulemaking requirements. This
casts serious doubt on any attempt to characterize the mandate as calling on
HHS's and OIG's rulemaking function. Also, the specificity to certain parties,
along with the retroactive nature of the opinions, tends to remove the advisory
opinion process from the traditional rulemaking model. With all of these factors
present, it is impossible to logically justify the advisory opinions as traditional
agency rulemaking. When issuing advisory opinions, OIG cannot hope to bring
us closer to any discernible rule of law via the traditional mechanics of agency
rulemaking. Clearly, OIG cannot comfortably don the rulemaker's hat as it
attempts to comply with HIPAA's advisory opinion mandate.
2. HIPAA Advisory Opinions as Ad Hoc Rulemaking
Apart from standard notice-and-comment rulemaking envisioned under the
APA, agencies can also engage in a breed of de facto rulemaking by
adjudication on a case-by-case basis.10 9 When proceeding to make rules in a
107 Promulgated under the notice-and-comment procedures delineated in the APA,
traditional rulemaking is particularly suited to determining legislative facts and policy of
general, prospective applicability. Specificity is more suited to trial-like procedures for
retrospective determination of specific facts about individual parties. See AMAN & MAYrON,
supra note 103, at 101. HIPAA advisory opinions are specific determinations of the facts in
individual cases. Thus, they lack the requisite generality to be legitimate agency rulemaking.
108 See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1994).
109 Just as there are clear advantages to rulemaking, there are disadvantages as well. The
disadvantages are primarily from the agency's perspective. "In large part, the disadvantages
are in terms of substantive rationality"-instead of being bound by rigid rules, an agency may
be better able to effectuate its policy goals through ad hoe "orders cut for the occasion .... It
would [rather] treat each case [on] its own merits" than try to fit it into an ill-fitting rle.
AMAN & MAYTON, supra note 103, at 71. This "idea is shown in a probation officer's
remarks about sentencing guidelines and new bureaucratic methods in his profession, that he
was now a 'bean counter' and that 'the probation officer's knowledge, experience, and
judgment are no longer [a] crucial [part of] the sentencing process.'" Id. (quoting Eugene D.
Natall, The Probation Officer, Bean Counting and Truth in Sentencing, 4 FED. SENCING
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case-by-case manner, the agency must wear the hat of the adjudicator, carefully
attending to the adversarial process to ensure fairness and accurate fact-
finding. 110
The Supreme Court, which has traditionally championed formal
rulemaking to attain administration by the rule of law, has recognized that
under certain circumstances it may be more appropriate for an agency to make
policy on a case-by-case basis. 111 The Court countenanced ad hoc agency
action in SECv. Chenery. 12 The Court noted that "the function of filling in the
interstices of [the Holding Company Act] should be performed as much as
possible through the quasi-legislative promulgation of rules to be applied in the
future,"11 3 consistent with rule of law principles. The Court then tempered this
statement with the following caveat: "[P]roblems may arise which the agency
could not reasonably foresee ... [or] the problems might be so specialized and
varying in nature as to be impossible of capture within the boundaries of a
general rule." 114 The Court went on to conclude that an agency should
ordinarily regulate by means of rules, but it may at times regulate ad hoc. An
agency may, in its "informed discretion," resort to case-by-case adjudication to
address orders to the issue at hand. 115
Rulemakers are not omniscient and the language of rules is at best
imperfect. Situations are bound to arise in which the application of a rigid rule
makes no sense, and indeed may even frustrate the policy behind the rule.
Thus, courts have countenanced ad hoc approaches to rulemaking when the
REP. 102 (1991)).
The adjudicative function of agencies has been around even longer than the rulemaking
function. See David L. Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the
Development of Administrative Policy, 78 HARv. L. REv. 921, 942-57 (1965) (discussing
agency reluctance to convert from adjudicatory models to rulemaking models). It is no
surprise that Congress addressed adjudication in the APA. The APA basically promotes rule
of law principles within agency adjudication by ensuring the process of an adversarial-type
hearing. The role of the adversarial process in adjudication is to promote fair determination of
the rights of parties based on truth-tested evidence. A good process, coupled with adequate
containment principles, can help preserve predictability in the rules and can help agencies
adjudicate equitably, while still adhering to the spirit of the rule of law principle.
110 For illustration's sake, this author envisions the proper hat for the adjudicative
function as the white powdered wig, historically worn by judges in English courts.
111 See AMAN & MAYrON, supra note 103, at 71.
112 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
113 Id. at 202.
114 Id. at 202-03.
115 Id. at 203. It is important to note that in recognizing the need for agency discretion to
proceed ad hoc, the Court was not turning its back on the rule of law. It was simply
acknowledging that sometimes the most efficient and practical way to achieve the eventual
rule of law was to proceed case-by-case.
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agency decides, in its informed discretion, that it is best to proceed ad hoc
rather than by formal rulemaking processes. 116 When such a situation arises, it
is appropriate for an agency to trade the crown of the rulemaker for the
powdered wig of the adjudicator. An agency may choose to proceed ad hoc for
a variety of reasons. 117
Whatever a particular agency's reasons may be for wanting to proceed ad
hoc, it is clear that HITS has not made that choice here. In fact, HI-IS has
specifically rejected this approach. 118 Under HIPAA, Congress has simply
made the choice for the agency. 1 9 This is an important factor that distinguishes
HIPAA's breed of ad hoc decisionmaking from traditional forms of ad hoc
rulemaling. If HIHS had chosen to proceed ad hoc, it would have done so
because it felt that better policy could be made case-by-case. After choosing the
adjudicatory route, HIHS would put on the adjudicator's wig, would have to
comply with the process requirements of the APA, and could engage in
thoughtful disposition of the cases before it.120 But HHS has specifically
116 See id.
117 For example, the agency may be faced with far-flung factual situations that do not
inure themselves to traditional rulemaking. Sometimes trying to make prospective rules will
result in more inconsistent policy than by proceeding on a case-by-case basis. See AMAN &
MAYrON, supra note 103, at 71.
1 18 Advisory opinions were one of the first methods the agency tried when it started
developing its policy under the anti-kickback statute. It was also one of the first methods
abandoned by 1HS after it proved unworkable. See supra Part II.A.
119 By forcing FMS to issue advisory opinions on request, which will interpret the law
in a specific factual situation to particular parties, with binding effect, Congress has
essentially forced H1-IS to proceed with administering the anti-kickback statute ad hoc. See
infra note 120 and accompanying text. It has made this choice without careful thought as to its
consequences. The Chenery Court countenanced ad hoc rulemaking when the agency
determined that it was the better course to proceed case-by-case rather than by general rles.
See Czenery, 332 U.S. at 203; supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text. Contrary to
proceeding ad hoc by its own discretion, the agency has been forced to proceed ad hoc by
Congress's uninformed discretion. See also WAIT Radio v. FCC, 418 F.2d 1153, 1157
(D.C. Cir. 1969) ("The agency's discretion to proceed in difficult areas through general rules
is fntmately linked to the existence of a safety valve procedure for consideration of an
application for exemption based on special circumstances.") (emphasis added).
120 HIPAA's advisory opinion process calls on a function that somewhat resembles
agency adjudication. First, the opinions would apply law to specific facts, with specific
parties, and with binding effect. This resembles agency adjudications. See AMAN & MAYTON,
supra note 103, at 199-201. Adjudications, under the APA, must be determined on the record
after an opportunity for an agency hearing. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(c)(2) (1994). Obviously, the
advisory opinion provides for no such process. Congress may not have intended for advisory
opinions to be adjudicatory proceedings. Unfortunately, an opinion rendered under the
mandate will have many characteristics of an adjudication, vis-a-vis simple advice-giving.
Thus, at least in part, the mandate calls on the adjudicative function of agencies, but does not
provide any of the procedural safeguards required by the APA. Moreover, agencies should
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abandoned this case-by-case route, at least through the use of advisory
opinions. Recall the difficulties outlined in Part lII.A with trying to render
advice on an intent-based statute from only a written submission from the
parties in interest. OIG has called the issuance of advisory opinions on intent-
based statutes "unprecedented." 121
The questionable mechanics of HIPAA's advisory opinion mandate
(determining intent from nothing but a written submission), the wide range of
results that will come out of the process (due to the inherently subjective nature
of intent), and the lack of procedural process usually present in adjudicative
actions makes HIPAA's mandate impossible to defend as calling for ad hoc
rulemaking. Thus, in attempting to comply with the mandate, it is clearly not
proper for the agency to wear the wig of the adjudicator.
It is also clear that these adjudicative-type decisions will not bring OIG any
closer to a rule that comports with the rule of law ideal. The completely
subjective nature of the inquiry would produce such inconsistent results that any
hope of distilling a clear rule out of the individual cases would be lost. When
one considers the practicality of how these opinions will be rendered, the hope
for emergence of a rule becomes bleaker still. The mandate forces OIG to
respond, upon request, within a limited period of time, and with only a written
submission from the requesting party with which to render an advisory
opinion. 122 HHS and 0IG are already facing a fiscal nightmare. 123 The
seek to avoid advice-giving from an adjudicatory pose. See Burnele V. Powell, Sinners,
Supplicants, and Samaritans: Agency Advice Giving in Relation to Section 554(e) of the
Administrative Procedure Act, 63 N.C. L. REy. 339, 355 (1985). Advice-giving actions by
agencies do not have to meet stringent procedural requirements, because most of the time
advice-giving is informal. HIPAA basically calls for action that has the relaxed process of
informal advice-giving, but all the binding results of an adjudication. Congress wants to have
its cake and eat it too, but cannot have it both ways if it hopes for the action to lead to
administration consistent with the rule of law.
12 1 See Letter from June Gibbs Brown, Inspector General of HHS, to Sen. Tom Harkin
(Sept. 29, 1995), in 141 CONG. Rac. S15159 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1995). Other commentators
agree with this assessment:
Although advisory opinions are an appropriate means of giving guidance to the
industry on some issues, it is clearly unwise to have the agencies in the positions of
opining on the intent of the person requesting the opinion. To have a Government agency
make an independent determination of what is in someone's head, based solely upon
what the person chooses to tell the agency, is a highly questionable Governnent
flnction.
142 CONG. REc. S9501, S9511 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1996) (statement of Sen. Cohen).
122 In asking OIG to divine a provider's intent solely from a written submission from the
inquirer, it seems Congress asks OIG to put on the mythical hat of a wizard or a psychic. The
problems inherent in this intent-based inquiry have been put before Congress, but have been
largely ignored. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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practical implication of this is that it will be impossible for HIHS to commit the
resources necessary to handle the requests in a careful manner. 124 The
emergence of a discernible rule from a quagmire of quickly written advisory
opinions, based only on a written submission from the parties, no doubt
cleverly crafted by counsel, is unlikely at best.
Thus, it is difficult to justify the advisory opinion process under HIPAA
from either a formal or an ad hoc rulemaking standpoint. The opinions will lack
the generality and prospectivity necessary to formulate general rules, and are
completely lacking the process necessary to be formal, prospective
rulemaking. t 25 The advisory opinion process cannot be justified as ad hoc
rulemaking, either. First, it completely lacks the process elements necessary to
ensure that the opinions are the result of careful fact-finding and the adversarial
process. 126 Also, the fact that the statute is based on intent means that every
advisory opinion will be inherently subjective, and thus will not get HIHS any
closer to a rule that applies across the board.
In fact, these opinions collectively would have only a negative effect. Both
OIG and DOJ have made their fears evident that defendants will try to build
reliance theories based on the opinions. Despite the appropriate caveats,
defense counsel can hold up a stack of advisory opinions and claim that the
client acted in good faith. 12 7 Since criminal convictions must be "beyond a
reasonable doubt," such a theory could hurt DOJ's chances of winning
convictions under the statute. 128 Thus, the only "rule" that may come out of
12 3 See Letter from June Gibbs Brown, Inspector General of HI-IS, to Sen. Tom Harkin
(Sept. 29, 1995), in 141 CoNG. REC. S15158, S15159 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1995) (stating "[a]s
a result of downsizing, OIG has had to close 17 OIG investigative offices and [now lacksl] an
investigative presence in 24 states. The OIG has only about 140 investigators for all Medicare
cases nationwide. By way of contrast, the State of New York gainfully employs about 300
persons to control Medicaid fraud in that State alone.").
124 Even if unlimited resources were available, more money will not change the fact that
discerning intent is a factual inquiry that requires the trnth-testing tools of the adversarial
process to be utilized with accuracy. It is possible that OIG could do a more complete and
thorough analysis if it had more resources, which may improve the quality of a given advisory
opinion. But the fact is that BHS is low on resources, which means that what little BHS can
expend on advisory opinions will effectively go to waste.
125 Here, "process" refers to the notice-and-comment procedures under the APA. See 5
U.S.C. § 553 (1994).
126 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
12 7 An informal dissemination process has developed with other advisory processes.
Organized members of the public likely to be affected by an agency advisory opinion
regularly send couriers to public information rooms to dig up these opinions so they can build
good faith reliance theories. See Powell, supra note 120, at 352.
12 8 See Letter from June Gibbs Brown, Inspector General of BHS, to Sen. Tom Harlin
(Sept. 29, 1995), in 141 CONG. REc. S15158, S15159 (daily ed. Oct. 13, 1995).
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this process is a de facto reliance rule, something to which the agency surely
would not have subjected itself had it been given the choice.
3. Advisory Opinions as Advice-Giving
It might be possible to rationalize the HIPAA advisory opinions as
administrative advice-giving, were it not for several characteristics that take
HIPAA's process out of the realm of traditional advice-giving models. Most
agencies tend to view their advice-giving actions as an aspect of their
rulemaking function. 129 Thus, advice-giving takes place outside of the
adjudicative realm, which typically involves specific parties with fixed interests
that are directly and immediately at risk. 130 Immediately, HIPAA's mandate
disagrees with the model because it involves specific parties who, in the context
of joint ventures, have fixed interests at stake. Further, the intent-based nature
of the statute means that any advice-giving could not apply to anyone else, as
intent is entirely subjective. The specificity inherent in HIPAA's advisory
opinions is at tension with the generality with which agencies prefer to give
advice. The type of specific findings demanded by the advisory opinion
mandate beg for some sort of adjudicatory process to insure accuracy and
fairness in their determination.
Advice-giving tends to be general and is much less formal by way of
process than adjudication. The hat worn by agencies while dispensing advice
under traditional models is an informal, common, everyday type of hat. By way
of illustration, it is more like a broken-in baseball cap, turned around
backwards, than it is like the crown or powdered wig worn by agencies in their
12 9 See Powell, supra note 120, at 348-49.
130 See id. This is a characteristic of adjudicatory proceedings, which have been viewed
by agencies as somewhat divorced from their advice-giving activities. There are practical
reasons why. Normally, advice-giving is very informal, with interested parties
communicating with low ranking staff members by telephone or in writing. See id. It is
generally understood that informal advice is not binding on the agency. See id. The agency
may sometimes choose to give advice in a more formal manner, and the public can rely on
this advice to a greater extent. See id. It generally costs less (in terms of staff expenses) for an
agency to offer informal advice than to offer formal, binding advice. Formal advice-giving
takes time, and requires higher levels of authority to make it valid. See id. at 353. Cost
savings translate into resources available for other matters, and the fact that lower level
employees have rendered non-binding advice gives the agency flexibility to change its position
later. See id. Because of the practical way that agencies give advice (keeping costs in mind), it
is questionable to order them to give advice that will bind the parties in the same way an
adjudication would. Thus, agencies try to avoid advice-giving from an adjudicatory posture,
and advice-giving is generally not viewed as encompassing determinations having specific
effects on individualized matters and specific parties. See id. at 354. Since the advisory




more formal capacities. Unfortunately, HIPAA's mandate has characteristics
that make it inappropriate for OIG to approach advisory opinions while wearing
this informal hat.
One of the major ingredients in an agency advice-giving scheme is
flexibility. In particular, "agencies seek control over the timing of their
responses and the significance that the public is allowed to attach to [them]." 131
HIPAA's mandate is at odds with this model in that the agency cannot pick and
choose when it will respond, and has no control as to the significance of its
responses. Agencies also, in general, like "to avoid advice giving from an
adjudicatory posture," 132 because it amounts to pre-adjudication adjudication
with no formal process to ensure stability and accurate fact-finding. The fact
that these letters are binding on the agency makes them similar to summary
adjudications, at least from the agency's perspective. The model advice-giving
scheme that can be generalized from contemporary administrative government
is, in a word, calculated. 133 It envisions that advice can be provided to the
public, but only under the circumstances and to the degree that the agency itself
believes appropriate.' 34 Clearly, HIPAA's mandatory advisory opinion
provision runs against this model. Thus, it is difficult to justify the mandate as
calling on an agency advice-giving function. Consequently, it seems
inappropriate for OIG to wear the advice-giver's cap while attempting to
comply with HIPAA's advisory opinion mandate.
131 Id. at 353.
132 Id. at 355. Illustratively, it would amount to playing the role of the adjudicator while
wearing the broken-in baseball cap of the everyday advice-giver.
133 An example of a more sound advice-giving model is SEC's use of no-action letters.
See Rowe, supra note 90. This model is distinct from HIPAA's mandate in several ways.
First, there is usually more communication than one written submission. See id. at 678.
Second, SEC is not required to respond by congressional mandate, but has instead developed
this model at its own discretion, and may choose not to respond. See id. at 708. Third, the
agency has at least some control over how much reliance the public can place on a given no-
action letter, and how binding the letters will be on the parties involved. See id. at 681-95
(suggesting a hierarchy of reliance on no-action letters).
134 See id. Efficiency is one of the chief factors that leads agencies to develop this sort of
advice-giving scheme. The agency knows that it has limited resources, so it wants to give
advice cheaply and quickly, involving as few higher level staff members as possible. The
sheer volume of advisory opinion requests may imndate OIG staff and make efficiency
impossible. The binding nature of the opinions will motivate OIG to involve senior members
in drafting them, which leads to more costs and less efficiency. See supra notes 123-24 and
accompanying text. The flexibility in terms of timing and importance that is preserved in
traditional advice-giving models helps agencies give advice within their budgets. That
flexibility is lost under HIPAA's advisory opinion mandate and further removes the mandate
from traditional advice-giving models.
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4. A Mandate Without a Leg on Which to Stand
It seems that no matter which way you slice it, HIPAA's mandate is out of
step with traditional agency functions, and in discord with the legal principles
that legitimize those functions. The mandate cannot be justified as rulemaking,
either formal or ad hoc. 135 It lacks the process, prospectivity, and neutrality that
legitimizes formal rulemaking by harmonizing it with rule of law principles.
The mandate lacks the process needed for legitimate ad hoc rulemaking, and a
choice by the agency to proceed ad hoc is conspicuously absent. It is also clear
that HIPAA calls for action that lacks the agency discretion in terms of response
and reliance needed to fit the mandate within an advice-giving model. 136 All in
all, it seems that HIPAA calls for agency action that has no theoretical leg on
which to stand. This lack of theoretical support leaves OIG in a position of
wondering which hat it should don when attempting to comply with the
mandate. 137 Since none of the hats in OIG's wardrobe is fit for the occasion,
HIPAA's mandate will force OIG to go "shopping for hats."
This author is sensitive to the need for guidance under the anti-kickback
statute, particularly in light of the rapid expansion of managed care and joint
ventures in the health care industry. Industry actors must be concerned that,
though they set up an agreement in good faith, they may nonetheless risk
sanction. The complexity of the statutory scheme, coupled with the persistent
split of authority in federal courts on the intent requirement, adds even more
uncertainty. However, HIPAA advisory opinions are not a legitimate answer to
the problem. What good is guidance if it leads to unprincipled and illegitimate
administration by the agency? Congress has literally forced OIG to adopt a
practice that has no hope of aspiring to the rule of law. Thus, the need for a
different solution to this problem is paramount.
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
As the previous discussion suggests, the advisory opinion mandate is not a
proper solution to the problems experienced by joint venturers under the anti-
kickback statute. This is not a problem without a solution, however. There are
a few possibilities that could serve to protect good faith venturers, yet still call
for agency action that can be legitimized by accepted practices and theories of
135 See supra Parts m11.B.1-2.
13 6 See supra Part Im.B.3.
137 To some degree, the uncomfortable mixture of functions called upon by HIPAA's
mandate would ask OIG to wear all three hats (rulemaker, adjudicator, and advice-giver) all
at once. The absurdity of the picture of June Gibbs Brown standing there, with a powdered
wig, a turned-around baseball cap, and a crown on her head all at once is an apt analogy to




A. Repeal the Mandate and Tailor Application of the Anti-Kickback
Statute Through Administrative Equity
First, Congress could repeal HIPAA section 205(b) (the advisory opinion
mandate) 138 wholesale. This is the most obvious solution to the problem. 139 It is
not certain how an initiative to repeal would fare on Capitol Hi1.140 Since the
mandate was overshadowed by the bill's enormously popular portability
provisions, and there was so little congressional attention paid to the matter, 141
it is difficult to predict how this mandate would have fared on its own merits.
The repeal of the advisory opinion mandate would still leave intact other
HIPAA provisions that call for more regular solicitation of public opinion on
enacting safe harbors and special fraud alerts. 142 Of course, it may take some
time before the dialogue between the public and the agency results in a solution.
But at least when that solution comes, it will have been born of the notice-and-
comment procedures in the APA's rulemaking guidelines,1 43 and thus will be
more in harmony with the theory of the rule of law.
If the mandate were repealed, providers would be forced to face life
without the instant advice granted them under HIPAA. To assuage industry
concerns for protecting good faith actors, a formal system of exceptions should
be in place to protect good faith actors under a theory of "administrative
138 See supra Part II.B.
139 It is probable that the health care industry will object to this solution, because its
members would be put back at square one. Yet, perhaps now is the time to question the
industry's complaints in general. How legitimate are the fears of joint venturers that OIG will
come after good faith actors with guns blazing? The fears look even less substantial when it is
considered that there is no evidence on the record to indicate that any trivial cases have ever
been pursued under the statute. See 142 CoNG. REC. S9541, S9543 (daily ed. Aug. 2, 1996)
(statement of Sen. Harkin, discussing the letter written to him by Inspector General June
Gibbs Brown).
14 0 President Clinton began advocating the advisory opinion mandate's repeal almost as
soon as he signed HIPAA into law. As yet, his efforts have been unsuccessful. However,
Clinton attempted the repeal as part of the Health Care Financing Administration's 1998
budget agreement. Thus, it is still difficult to say with certainty how the advisory opinion
process would fare, standing completely alone. See JosT & DAvIEs, supra note 37, at 167-
68.
141 See supra note 82.
142 See HIPAA §§ 205(a), (c) (safe harbors; special fraud alerts), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-
7d (West Supp. 1997). These mandates force OIG to step up its dialogue with the public
concerning the reach of the anti-kickback provision.




equity." 144 Systems of administrative equity are at use in other agencies. 145
While overusing exceptions may inadvertently swallow the rule, 146
administrative equity can be appropriately contained so that granting exceptions
in appropriate cases will not necessarily violate the rule of law. 147 A look at the
implications of the anti-kickback statutes on joint venturers suggests that a good
faith actor who is nonetheless exposed to criminal sanctions may be able to
qualify for a recognized and containable category of administrative equity, such
as "economic hardship" equity or "reasonableness" equity.
Exceptions to rules based on economic hardship begin with the idea that
"[e]quity will not allow the application of a particular regulation to force a firn
out of business or render a piece of property valueless unless the social benefits
of compliance with that regulation outweigh the severe costs to the
petitioner." 148 A joint venturer could conceivably be faced with the threat of
economic extinction if he is sanctioned for setting up a particular structure. 149
Even if a joint venturer is not sanctioned, but is simply told "no, you cannot do
that" by OIG, the economic pressures in the market that prompted the joint
venture in the first place may end up forcing the joint venturer out of
144 What some commentators have dubbed "administrative equity" is nothing more than
allowing exceptions to provide a safety valve to agencies, when enforcing a rule by its four
comers would work an injustice in a particular case. Criteria and processes can be established
under which administrators can do justice in individual cases, when the rule fails to do so by
itself. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Equity: An Analysis of Exceptions to
Administrative Rides, 1982 DUKE L.J. 277, 278. Under administrative equity systems, the
agency casts off the crown of the general rulemaker, and dons the powdered wig of the
adjudicator, crafting specific exceptions in specific cases.
145 One example is the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. See generalty Rossi,
supra note 106.
146 This fear is very speculative. Given the relative infr-equency of agency sanctions,
coupled with the lack of actual attempts at prosecution, see supra note 139, the need to grant
an exception to a perhaps erroneously prosecuted individual would be rare indeed.
147 Containment principles are what keep actions in administrative equity from violating
the rule of law. If exceptions to rules are freely and easily granted, with little or no regard for
principle, the inner morality of law may be jeopardized. "Exceptions to administrative rules
need not be granted or denied on a random basis .... For the most part, [exceptions are
limited by] certain equitable principles and the norms that underlie those
principles .... Three broad categories of exceptions relief emerge. These are hardship
exceptions, fairness exceptions, and policy exceptions." See Aman, supra note 144, at 292-
93.
148 Id. at 294-95.
149 Violations of the statute can result in heavy fines, and a violation of the anti-kickback
statute results in automatic exclusion from the Medicare program. See McDowell, supra note
1, at 725-26. Exclusion from the program could spell economic death for many providers
such as nursing homes who derive a great deal of revenue from Medicare patients.
[Vol. 59:303
MEDICAREFRAUD
business. 150 It seems that a joint venturer who acted in good faith does not
present such a threat to society that the societal costs of letting him continue
would outweigh the costs of forcing him out business. Thus, joint venturers
should be able to qualify, in some cases, for an exception to the anti-kickback
statute under a theory of economic hardship administrative equity.
Another relevant form of administrative equity is a reasonableness
exception. At the heart of a reasonableness exception is the notion that "[e]quity
may allow an exception when compliance with a rule either does not further the
goals of the statute or minimally advances those goals at a cost to the petitioner
wholly disproportionate to the benefits produced." 151 In the case of the good
faith joint venturer, who inadvertently violates the technical terms of the anti-
kickback statute, it seems this equitable exception would provide safety. The
goals of the anti-kickback statute are to put those who intentionally defraud the
system in jail and exclude them from the program. While putting innocent
venturers in jail will not further this goal, neither will excluding them from the
system. The cost of prosecuting them, or excluding them, is great: either they
will be imprisoned or suffer great economic damage. It seems that a good faith
actor would qualify for this sort of administrative equity.
To provide some guidance under the system of exceptions, HIS could
promulgate specific factors that it will consider in deciding whether to grant an
exception. These factors could be made pursuant to notice-and-comment
rulemaking procedures consistent with the APA, and consequently with the rule
of law principle. 152 Publishing criteria by which equitable claims should be
considered would help give prospective guidance to joint venturers, and would
add legitimacy to HIHS enforcement under the anti-kickback statute.
B. Make Response Discretionary
In the alternative to a wholesale repeal, Congress could amend the word
"shall" to "may," making issuance of the advisory opinions discretionary. This
may seem a simplistic solution, but it has the elegance of putting the agency
action (rendering an advisory opinion) into a more traditional advice-giving
model. With this added discretion, OIG could carefully choose when it wants to
respond, and can more carefully control the public's ability to rely on the
opinions. This would also give the agency freedom to utilize its resources in a
more efficient manner.' 53 To help empower the industry to obtain agency
150 See supra Part I.A.
151 Aman, supra note 144, at 311.
152 Here, OIG can comfortably wear the crown of rulemaker.
153 See supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text. One drawback to this solution is that
it would still call on the agency to give advice to specific parties with already fixed interests.
However, by enabling OIG to turn down a request, the possibility is created that OIG can
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review, Congress could provide that OIG at least respond to a request with an
explanation as to why it feels giving an advisory opinion on that inquiry would
be inappropriate.
C. Make Advisory Opinions Non-Binding
Alternatively, Congress could simply make the advisory opinions non-
binding. This would have two positive effects. First, it would greatly reduce the
possibility of third parties building reliance theories on opinions rendered to
strangers. This would help avoid the negative de facto reliance rule that the
current advisory opinion mandate makes imminent.154 In addition, making the
advisory opinions non-binding would serve to give the agency more discretion
in allocating its scarce resources. If the letters are non-binding, many requests
can be confidently handled by lower level, lower paid staff employees. 155 This
brings the process more in line with traditional advice-giving models by letting
the agency decide how high up the chain of command a particular inquiry will
go, and likewise to what extent a third party can rely on that information. 156
This solution leaves the power to initiate the advice-giving process in the hands
of the interested joint venturers, but reduces the negative impact that the flood
of requests will have on OIG's efficiency.
V. CONCLUSION
While it seems that Congress had admirable intentions when it passed
1IIPAA's advisory opinion mandate, it also seems clear that Congress chose a
questionable vehicle for realizing those intentions. The advisory opinion
mandate does more to hurt the overall problem than it does to help it. Any
wait for a question to be asked by several parties, then respond with a general and prospective
advisory opinion that would apply across the board. Thus, changing "shall" to "may" would
create a more traditional system of advice-giving.
154 See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
155 These lower level employees are undoubtedly suited for wearing the tuned-around
baseball cap of the informal advice-giver. They may not, however, be well suited for the
crown or the powdered wig which they will effectively be forced to wear under the mandate
in its current form, given the adjudicatory aspects of the mandate.
156 See Powell, supra note 120, at 353. "In particular, agencies seek control over the
timing of their responses and the significance that the public is allowed to attach to those
responses. Ideally, they seek resolutions that resolve inquiries... at the lowest practicable
level of authority. Cost savings [from utilizing lower levels of authorities] translates into
resources available for other matters, and lower-level resolutions promote flexibility by




guidance under such a mandate would be questionable as to reliability, 157 and
would force the agency to compromse traditional theories of administrative law
m the process. The curious mixture of agency functions called upon by the
mandate will leave OIG m the uncomfortable position of wearing multiple hats,
all at once, or go shopping for an entirely new hat that it has never worn
before. The clear solution to the quandary created by HIPAA's advisory
opinion mandate is for Congress either to repeal the mandate and formulate
exceptions to the anti-ackback statute, or to amend the mandate to make the
advisory opinions discretionary or non-binding on the agency
157 See supra Part IllI.A, and the discussion of why it is basically impossible to render
sound advice under an intent-based statute based solely on a written submission from the
inquirer.
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